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There is a growing interest in the measurement of the levels and
the costs of agricultural protection. Levels of agricultural pro-
tection are measured and compared across countries in various
recent studies by national ministries and international organiza-
tions [World Bank (1986), FAO (1987a), OECD (1987, 1988), USDA
(1987, 1988)]. These comparisons may be used, e.g., in inter-
national negotiations on agricultural trade liberalization
[Tangermann/Josling/Pearson (1987)]. In another branch of the li-
terature, domestic and international prices are compared in order
to evaluate national agricultural policies from a welfare-
economic point of view or to study the implications of agri-
cultural protection for world market prices and trade [Tyers/
Anderson (1986) , Valdes/Zietz (1980) , Matthews (1985) , Parikh/
Fischer/Frohberg/Gulbrandsen (1988)].
It is well-known from this literature that the measurement of
agricultural protection has important implications for policy
evaluation. Despite this and the fact that nominal and effective
rates of protection are widely used in the trade literature,
protection levels in agriculture were often measured in a rather
crude way. Consequently, policy conclusions were in many cases
derived from studies using crude protection levels. Westlake
(1987) argues that several studies on agricultural protection
ignored transport and marketing costs. His empirical analyses
suggest that these costs matter for the magnitude of the measured
level of protection, especially in developing countries.
Byerlee/Sain (1986) show that the measured subsidization of or
discrimination against agriculture is strongly affected when
overvalued exchange rates are taken into account. Furthermore,
they argue that heavily fluctuating world prices distort the
measured degree of protection and vote for the use of normal in-
stead of actual world prices in the calculation of protection
rates.- 2 -
Our paper elaborates further how measurement issues are important
when agricultural protection is analyzed. It reveals that policy
conclusions vary due to the way agricultural protection is
measured. We focus on two aspects which have been widely ignored
in the literature: price uncertainty and limited substitution. In
the first part, we start from the important findings of Byerlee/
Sain (1986). These authors tried to cope with world price un-
certainty and derived for the wheat sector the challenging and
unexpected result that developing countries do not systematically
discriminate against agriculture. We will show that this major
finding is heavily dependent on the way price uncertainty is
measured. When normal world prices are modelled on the basis of
an econometric world wheat model rather than with trend analysis,
the qualitative result changes. In the second part, we investi-
gate how the modelling of substitution between agricultural
products affects the calculated impacts of given levels of agri-
cultural protection. The assumption of the law of one price,
which is mostly used in agricultural economics, is dropped and
imperfect substitutability of foreign and domestically produced
products of the same category is allowed for within an Armington
(1969) framework. Such a more realistic modelling of agricultural
markets influences the effects of government interventions on
trade and welfare significantly as an application to rice in
Malaysia illustrates.
2. How Price Uncertainty Matters for the Measurement of Protec-
tion Levels in Agriculture
2.1 The Results of the Byerlee/Sain Study
For many years, agricultural economists have argued that develop-
ing countries often discriminate against agriculture in their
economic and agricultural policies [Brown (1978); Lutz/Scandizzo
(1980); Schultz (1978)]. The urban population is believed to be
favoured at the direct expense of the rural population. The study
of Byerlee/Sain (1986) tests this hypothesis within a cross-
country analysis. Nominal protection coefficients are computed
for the wheat sector in 1980-82 and consumer and producer prices- 3 -
are distinguished. In three respects, the Byerlee/Sain approach
goes beyond earlier quantitative studies:
1. Nominal protection coefficients are calculated at one point of
the marketing chain. Transport costs are taken into account.
2. Nominal protection coefficients are not only computed with
official exchange rates, but also with corrected exchange
rates which are supposed to incorporate exchange-rate over-
valuation in many developing countries.
3. Nominal protection coefficients are based on "normal" world
prices. This is done in order to avoid a comparison of do-
mestic prices with fluctuating world prices.
Major results of the Byerlee/Sain study confirm the conventional
wisdom on consumer subsidies but challenge the traditional view
on producers' incentives:
1. A widespread policy of subsidizing consumers is indicated by
the results of Byerlee/Sain.
2. The authors find out that producer prices for wheat in develo-
ping countries approached long-run trend prices in the world
wheat market during 1980-82 and showed no consistent evidence
of price disincentives to wheat producers.
It is now analyzed whether this second finding depends on the
particular methodology Byerlee/Sain used.
2.2 The Importance of Price Uncertainty for the Measurement of
Producers' Incentives in Wheat
Byerlee/Sain calculate their nominal protection coefficient,
which we call NPC. , as follows:
1) NPCl = pD/p*.- 4 -
p is the domestic producer price of wheat in 1980-82 and p* is a
normal world wheat price in the same period, measured by a linear
time-trend regression of world prices over the period 1960-82.
Both prices are evaluated at the consumption points. This
methodology differs from the usual procedure by introducing a
normal world price rather than the actual world price (p ). One
w
might argue with Byerlee/Sain that normal world prices are an
indicator of expected world prices whereas actual world prices
include a stochastic component u:
(2) pw = P* + u.
Hence, the approach of Byerlee/Sain can be interpreted as one
which deals with price uncertainty whereas the traditional
approach does not. The traditional nominal protection coeffi-
cient, which we call NPC?, is defined as
(3) NPC2 = pD/pw.
Appendix 2 shows in columns (1) and (2) the nominal protection
coefficients NPC. and NPC_ for the 31 selected developing coun-
1 tries. Table 1 presents in columns (1) and (2) the respective
frequency distributions of. NPC. and NPCO.
From this, it can be derived how the countries' nominal protec-
tion coefficients were affected due to the Byerlee/Sain method.
Column (1) in Table 1 describes nominal protection as measured by
Byerlee/Sain and column (2) nominal protection as measured tradi-
tionally .
Whereas the actual world wheat price was 202.17 $/mt in 1980-82,
the normal world price according to the Byerlee/Sain method was
182.11 $/mt. This implies that the denominator of the nominal
protection coefficient was reduced by 9.9% due to the Byerlee/
Sain approach. As Table 1 shows, the qualitative results change
when NPC.. and NPCO are compared:- 5 -
Table 1: The Influence of Price Uncertainty on the Frequency
Distribution of Nominal Protection Coefficients for










































For the definition of
text.
NPC. to NPC3, see Appendix 2 and the
Source: Own computations from Appendix 2 and the sources cited
there.- 6 -
1. On the basis of the Byerlee/Sain method, it has to be con-
cluded that more developing countries subsidized wheat pro-
duction than taxed it. A significant taxation in their study-
means that NPC is below 0.85 and a significant subsidization
2
is indicated by a NPC above 1.15. When the traditional
methodology is applied, the reverse is true. The frequency
distribution of NPC,, shows that 39% of the developing coun-
tries taxed their wheat production whereas 29% subsidized it.
On the basis of NPC?, however, we receive the conventional
result saying that most developing countries tax their
agricultural sectors.
2. The introduction of the normal rather than the actual wheat
price has raised the average NPC from 1.02 to 1.13. As the
NPCs are not normally distributed, the frequency distribution
can be more adequately described by the median NPC. Again, the
median NPC- shows with a value of 0.92 that the typical de-
veloping country taxed its wheat production. The median NPC.. ,
however, had presented a slight subsidization of wheat pro-
duction .
The results show that the introduction of price uncertainty into
the calculation of world wheat prices raised nominal protection
by a significant degree. Obviously, the policy-relevant con-
clusions on the subsidization or taxation of agriculture depend
strongly on the methodology used.
2.3 How the Measurement of Producers' Incentives Depends on the
Approach to Modelling Price Uncertainty
Suppose now that we agree with Byerlee/Sain that normal rather
than actual world prices should be utilized in the calculation of
nominal protection coefficients. Does than the economic result,
that more countries subsidize wheat production than tax it,
depend on the econometric model used to calculate the normal
world price? Or, in terms of price uncertainty: Does the method
which is used to eliminate the stochastic component affect the
economic results? In order to answer this question, a reduced-- 7 -
form econometric model of the world wheat market was estimated.
The estimated world wheat price from this econometric model (p**)
w
was introduced as normal price into the calculation of the
nominal protection coefficients. The resulting nominal pro-
tection coefficient, which we call NPC-, differs from the
Byerlee/Sain approach by the way the normal world price is
calculated:
(4) NPC3 = PD/P**.
The econometric model is based on a stylized representation of
import demand and export supply in the world wheat market. The
export supply function is
(5) Xt = a + b
and the import demand function
(6) Mfc = f + g Pwfc + h pRfc + i YMt + j PRMt + k PR^ + 1 Mt X is exports and M is imports of wheat, p stands for the world
wheat price, po for the world rice price, PR for production of
3
wheat and POP for population. Y is an income variable. The sub-
script X indicates exporting and the subscript M importing coun-
tries, t and t-1 are the two periods considered. In an equili-
brium situation, exports are equal to imports:
(7) Xfc = Mfc.
Introducing (5) and (6) into (7) yields the reduced form of the
world wheat model:
(8) pwt = f/(b-g) + h/(b-g) • pRt
+ k/(b-g) • PR^.-L + l/(b-g) • POPMfc - a/(b-g) -
c/(b-g) • PRxt - d/(b-g) • PR^^ - e/(b-g) •Equation (8) was the starting point of the econometric model. In
order to save degrees of freedom, however, the production and
population variables of the exporting and importing countries
were aggregated. This seemed acceptable since it was not the goal
of this analysis to identify the underlying supply and demand
functions (5) and (6). The following regression model performed
best in the specification search:
(9) In p = 12.0621 .+ 0.7290 In p + 0.3045 In Y ,
(2.90) (5.61) (1.26)
- 1.3758 In PRt - 1.3945 In PRfc_1
(-2.41) (-2.59)




2 = 0.94; F = 58.49; DW = 1.66)
_2
The values in parentheses are t-values. R is the corrected
coefficient of determination, F the F-value and DW the Durbin/
Watson coefficient. The variables were measured as described in
Appendix 1, and the data basis for 1960-82 is also presented
there. The estimation period is the same as in the Byerlee/Sain
study. Given the common test statistics, the overall performance
of the econometric model is satisfactory. The coefficients of the
independent variables had the expected signs and they were sta-
tistically different from zero in all cases except for the income
variable. The world wheat price rises with an increasing world
rice price, with a reduced world wheat production in the same year
and in the previous year and with a rising world population. The
sign of the income variable indicates also that the world wheat
price is raised by a growing PPP-corrected gross domestic product
in major wheat-importing countries. The coefficient of the
production variable can be interpreted as price flexibility. An
increase of world wheat production by 1% reduces the world wheat
price by 1.38%.- 9 -
Various measures of simulation errors show that the econometric
model outperforms in each case the linear time-trend model as
applied by Byerlee/Sain. This is illustrated in Table 2. The
absolute simulation error, measured by the root-mean square
simulation error (RMSE) or the mean absolute simulation error
(MAE), is much lower for the econometric world wheat model than
for the linear time-trend model. The same holds true for the
relative simulation error as indicated by the mean absolute
percentage error (MAPE): The MAPE value is higher than 20% for
the trend model but only 8.1% for the econometric model. Theil's
inequality coefficient GMTU compares the simulation errors of the
competing models with a naive simulation on the basis of previous
year's values. It shows that the time-trend model performs worse
than a naive simulation whereas the econometric wheat model
clearly outperforms the naive simulation.
The antilog of the In p values characterizes the normal world
wheat price on the basis of the reduced-form world wheat model.
Computing the antilog for 1
as defined by equation (4).
Computing the antilog for 1980-82 yields the denominator of NPC
4
The results are given in Appendix 2 and Table 1. Column (3) of
Appendix 2 shows NPC, for the selected developing countries and
column (3) of Table 1 indicates the frequency distribution of
these nominal protection coefficients. In order to elaborate the
influence of the methodology, which is used to eliminate world
price uncertainty, we compare NPC.. with NPC-:
1. Due to the better explanation of movements in world wheat
prices, the normal price according to the structural model is
closer to the actual world price than the linear-trend price,
p** is 193.79 $/mt as opposed to p* with 182.11 $/mt. This
means that NPC_ is by 6.0% lower than NPC1 for all countries.
Table 1 shows that this makes a significant difference for the
frequency distribution of the NPCs. Whereas more developing
countries subsidized than taxed wheat production according to- 10 -
Table 2 : Accuracy of Simulations of the Econometric World Wheat
Price Model Compared with a Linear Time-Trend Model,
1960-82
a
Simulation Linear Time- Econometric
Simulation Model Trend Model World Wheat Price
Error Measurement Model
RMSE ($/mt): - 27.59 12.05
MAE ($/mt): 23.90 9.12
MAPE (%): 21.21 • 8.09
Theil's inequality
coefficient (GMTU): 1.20 0.53
a RMSE, the root-mean square simulation error, is defined as
2 /(l/n)-I e . The mean absolute simulation error, MAE, is (1/n)
lie. |. The mean absolute percentage error, MAPE is defined as
(100/n) • I|e, |/p.. Theil's inequality coefficient is measured as
2 2







e simulation error is e =
P+. ~ P+. r where p is the estimated and p the actual world wheat
price in period t. The econometric model is shown in equation (9)
in the text. In each definition, it is summed over all periods t
with t=l,...,n.
Source: Own computations with data from Appendix 1 and the
sources cited there.- 11 -
Byerlee/Sain, this is not true any more when world price un-
certainty is eliminated with a different method. According to
NPC , 39% of the countries did significantly tax wheat pro-
duction whereas only 32% subsidized it.
2. The median NPCs show a differential qualitative result, too.
When normal prices are measured with the econometric model
(9), the traditional qualitative result is confirmed. The
typical developing country tends to discriminate against the
wheat sector. The median NPC- is 0.96 compared with 1.02 for
the Byerlee/Sain method.
These results show that it is not only the introduction of price
uncertainty which matters for the measured protection levels. It
is also the way how normal world prices are modelled, or, how
price uncertainty is eliminated which affects the measured degree
of agricultural protection.
3. How Limited Substitution Matters for the Measurement of Wel-
fare Effects in' Agriculture
In the following, it will be shown that methodology does not only
matter for the measured degree of protection. Starting from an
apparent degree of protection, as implied by the wedge between
domestic prices and the border price, it can be derived that
standard assumptions in agricultural market analyses are also
crucial for the calculated impacts of government pricing
policies. The homogeneity assumption is a case in point.
3.1 Concepts for the Measurement of Welfare Effects
The analysis of agricultural incentives including calculations of
producer and consumer surplus is often done market by market
under the assumption of the "law of one price" [e.g. Scandizzo/
Bruce (1980); Bale/Lutz (1981); Bale (1985)]. However, such an
analysis will give the correct welfare effects only, if:- 12 -
1. the commodity in question is not a substitute or complement
for any other commodity,, and if
2. there is perfect substitution between foreign and domestically
produced varieties of that commodity.
The chances that such a good exists in agriculture are small and
the errors of standard welfare analyses can be substantial. While
intermarket connections are now widely recognized, individual
agricultural markets as those for wheat and rice are still mostly
regarded as homogeneous markets where arbitrage quickly equates
goods prices internationally at least under free trade. This
hypothesis, however, "has probably been rejected more decisively
by empirical evidence than any other hypothesis in the history of
economics" [Williamson (1983), p. 201)]. In fact, cross, hauling,
which is ruled out by the law of one price can be found in agri-
cultural trade statistics at the most disaggregated commodity
level [e.g. FAO (a); IRRI (1988)]. Furthermore, empirical evi-
dence from Asia [e.g. ADB (1988)] shows that even for such a
narrowly defined market as that for rice, there exists a wide
spectrum of domestic prices indicating limited substitution
possibilities between different varieties. In a recent study
[Ardeni (.1989)], the law of one price is rejected quite uniformly
for various agricultural markets.
There are two major reasons why agricultural products from
foreign and domestic suppliers may not be perfect substitutes in
domestic use. Differences in the technical characteristics may
affect final demand. For example, processing diminishes the
nutritive value of rice by reducing the protein and vitamin
content. Imported and domestic rice of differing degrees of
processing may therefore.be imperfect substitutes. Market rigi-
dities may also influence demand from competing supply.
Commercial relationships, traditions and custom or simply imper-
fect information may limit the willingness of consumers to
substitute perfectly among the products of competing suppliers.
In this case, products which may be technically indistinguishable
are differentiated by place of production.- 13 -
Product differentials are sometimes considered in standard wel-
fare analyses by correcting the border price, i.e. the standard
against which to judge domestic intervention prices [e.g. ADB
(1988)]. If for example, the nutrient content of domestic rice is
lower, the border price is corrected downwards and vice versa if
the nutritive value of domestic rice is higher. By this means,
the price, quantity and welfare effects, e.g. of a floor price,
are underestimated if the domestic variety is inferior and over-
estimated if it is superior. Underlying this procedure is the
assumption of close substitutes in which case the price differ-
entials remain constant during liberalization [Hiemenz/von
Rabenau (1973) , p. 83] .
A different result is obtained if the products cannot be regarded
as close substitutes because of consumer preferences. If the
cross-price elasticity of the import substitute with respect to
changes in the price of the imported product is relatively low
i.e. the quantity adjustment in the market for the domestic
product is not sufficiently large to induce an equal change in
the domestic price - the actual protection [Hiemenz/von Rabenau
(1973), p. 83] and consequently the actual welfare effects are
overestimated in the traditional model.
In the following we will first show how limited substitution can
be introduced into a model of an agricultural market, and then
discuss how this influences the outcome of government-imposed
distortions. We shall discuss these issues more specifically with
reference to rice in Malaysia.
3.2 How Limited Substitution Affects Welfare
A convenient way of introducing limited substitution into an
agricultural-market model is the use of the so-called Armington
formulation [which includes perfect substitutability as a special
case]. This treats similar products produced in different
countries as qualitatively different, i.e. heterogeneous rather
than homogeneous as in standard welfare analyses. In the context
of rice, the Armington approach implies that domestic consumers- 14 -
demand a composite commodity, C, which is a function of imported
quantities, M, and domestically produced quantities, D:
(10) C = C(M,D)
Since total expenditure on the composite commodity must equal
expenditure on its imported and domestic components, we have the
following budget constraint:.
(11) PC = PMM + PDD
where P, PM and P^ stand for the composite commodity price, the
import price, and the price for the domestic import substitute
respectively.
Assuming that consumers minimize the cost of purchasing a given
amount of the composite good, the demand for imported and
domestic rice will be functions of both, the domestic price and
the import price. The supply, S, of domestic rice will be a
function of its own price:
(12) M = M(PM,PD)
D = D(PD,PM)
S = S(PD)
Now consider two varieties of rice that are substitutes in
demand. The supply of imported rice is perfectly elastic under
the small-country assumption, while the supply of domestic rice
is upward sloping. As a result of government-imposed distortions
the domestic prices of both varieties are above the border price
and the welfare gains of free trade are to be calculated. The
situation is depicted in Figure 1. The demand curves for imported
and domestic rice are each conditional on the other's price, i.e.
M(Pn) and D(PM). The demands are also conditional on income, but
this income is assumed to be constant with respect to the policy
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1 D0 D- 16 -
Now let the price for M decrease from P., to P.. as a result of
M M
liberalization. Initially, consumers attempt ,to increase M from
M to M , but because of substitution in demand the lower price
for M causes a decrease in consumers' demand for D. This shift in
demand for D from D(PM) to D(P.,) causes a change in P^ from P_ to . MM . D D 0
P , which, in turn, leads to a shift in demand for M from M(P )
1 1
to M(P ). The new equilibrium finally occurs at price P and
quantity M .
Thus, the demand relationship M*, which takes account of
adjustments in the market for domestic rice, is obtained and this
relationship is less elastic than the movement along M(Pn).
The total welfare gain generated by liberalization is the shaded
triangle under M*. As shown by Just/Hueth/Schmitz [1982),
pp. 188-192], that triangle measures consumer gains in the import
market net of the loss of government revenues as well as the
gains to consumers and losses to producers in the market for the
domestic substitute.
What then determines the price adjustment in the domestic market?
Assuming a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) function for
equation (10) de Melo/Robinson (1985) derive an expression which
• °
relates percentage changes in the domestic price (Prj)
 t
o per-
centage changes in the domestic price for imports (PM):
n,, £ (o - 5) 0 2 ^
1J
; ^D £ + 5 + (o-5) © M
where o is the elasticity of substitution between imports and
domestically produced substitutes; 5 is the price elasticity of
demand for the composite commodity; 0 is the import share; and £
is the price elasticity of domestic supply.
As can be seen from equation (13), the price adjustment in the
market for domestic rice depends crucially on the elasticity of
substitution. Thus, the higher the elasticity of substitution the
larger the price adjustment for domestic rice.- 17 -
Furthermore, from equation (13), it can be seen that for any
elasticity of substitution, the responsiveness of the domestic
price depends on the import share. Thus, even if imported and
domestic rice are close substitutes in demand, the response of
the domestic price to a change in the import price will be small
if the import share is low. -
Finally, the derived nature of demand for domestic rice is shown
by the presence of the supply elasticity in equation (13). Thus,
the higher the elasticity of supply, the smaller the adjustment
in the domestic price necessary to bring back equilibrium in the
market. The same can be said of the role of the price elasticity
of demand for the composite good.
3.3 Economic Effects of Rice Market Price Interventions in
Malaysia
In this section, we investigate numerically the impact of
government intervention on welfare in the case of perfect and
limited substitution possibilities. In doing so, the basic
premise is that government policies distort producer incentives
and influence the efficiency of resource allocation. However, as
will be shown, the welfare effects measured in the traditional
model overestimate the negative impact of government intervention
because they do not take account of limited substitution
possibilities between different varieties of rice. The methodo-
logy involves the systematic elimination of distortions from
existing price levels to obtain a picture of supply and demand
conditions under a no-intervention scenario.
In order to do this, an Armington model featuring product dif-
ferentiation in domestic demand [Dervis/de Melo/Robinson (1982),
pp. 232-239] was calibrated for prices and quantities on the rice
market for the period. 1982-1.986 given, in Tamin/Meyanathan (1988)
and solved for the no-intervention prices and quantities. The
supply, demand and substitution elasticities were taken from
Tamin/Meyanathan (1988) and Ahluwalia/Lysy (1983). Because the
elasticity estimates differ widely from researcher to researcher- 18 -
and because we wished to demonstrate the sensitivity of the
results to changes in elasticities,' the supply, demand and sub-
stitution elasticities presented in Table 3 and 4 are the point
elasticities +^0.5 times the point elasticities given by the
7
sources. Thus, the results are providing orders of magnitude,
rather than exact measures. -
The overall results of the partial equilibrium analyses are shown
in Tables 3 and 4. The effects of the price interventions are
evaluated in terms of: net social efficiency losses, the welfare
trade-off between producers and consumers, and changes in
government revenue and expenditure.
If imported and domestically produced rice are perfect substi-
tutes, the welfare trade-off depends on the price elasticities of
supply and demand and the difference between the intervention and
border price of rice. Between 1982 and 1986 the domestic consumer
and producer prices in Malaysia have always been above the border
price. The nominal protection coefficients on production and
consumption rose steadily from 1982 onwards to a maximum in 1985.
In the high elasticity case (Table 4), producer gains are esti-
mated at M$ 623.6 million and government expenditure at M$ 63.6
million in 1985. However, consumers suffered an overall loss of
M$ 670.2 million due to government intervention. Thus, the net
social welfare loss (i.e. the deadweight efficiency loss)
amounted to M$ 110.2 million. Over the entire study period . •the
accumulated total producer gain was estimated at M$ 2430.0
million offset by a total consumer welfare loss of M$ 2006.4
million. Accumulated total government expenditures are estimated
at M$ 727.6 million. Net total efficiency losses due to rice
intervention•in Malaysia tended to rise over the 1980s and summed
up to M$ 303.9 million over the study period. Comparing these
results with those of the low elasticity case (Table 3) shows
that the losses depend linearly on the assumed supply and demand
elasticities. .Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis on the Price, Quantity and Welfare Effects of Rice Price Interventions, Malaysia 1982-1986
a (Low Supply and Demand Elasticities)
Reference Solution
Elasticity of Supply, it
Elasticity of Demand, \i
Elasticity of Substitution, o
Production, X (000MT)
Net Imports, M (000MT)
Consumption, C (000MT)
World Price, PW (USS/MT)
Exchange Rate (MS/USS)
Border Price, PB (MS/MT)
Consumer Price, PC (M5/MT)




Shift to no Intervention
Decrease in Producer Price (%)
Decrease in Consumer Price (%)
Decrease in Output (000MT)





















































































































































































































































































































































































Total Deadweight Loss (M$m)
318.3 470.5 493.4 658.8 601.5
-122.8 -335.0 -414.2 -631.9 -412.3
-200.1 -150.6 -99.5 -63.6 -213.8
4.6 15.1 20.2 36.7 24.6
253.9 369.4 400.0 522.2 429.3 180.5 262.5 299.1
-105.3 -285.3 -366.5 • -549.2 -318.9 -S3.1 -223.2 -301.5
-151.6 -94.4 -48.4 0.5 -124.4 -99.0 -44.9 -6.7





Data for the reference solution are taken from Tamin/Meyanathan (1988) except for the supply, demand, and substitution elasticities which are 1.5 times the
point estimates given by Tamin/Meyanathan (1988) and Ahluwalia/Lysy 1983), respectively. The border price includes transport cost but was not corrected for
quality differences [see Tamin/Meyanathan (1988) , footnote 14] .
Source : (i
r«M
 («.;o;:;pLlI;.\ t iO;i:". .Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis on the Price, Quantity and Welfare Effects of Rice Price Interventions, Malaysia 1982-1986
a (High Supply and Demand Elasticities)
Reference Solution
Elasticity of Supply, TT
Elasticity of Demand, v
Elasticity of Substitution, o
Production, X (000MT)
Net Imports, M (000MT)
Consumption, C (000MT)
World Price, PW (USS/MT)
Exchange Rate (M$/US$)
Border Price, PB (MS/MT)
Consumer Price, PC (M$/MT)




Shift to no Intervention
Decrease in Producer Price (%)
Decrease in Consumer Price (%) '
Decrease in Output (000MT)
























































































































































































































































































































































































Total Deadweight Loss (MSm)
310.6 452.2 471.4 623.6 572.2
-124.3 -347.0 -432.6 -670.2 -432.3
-200.1 -150.6 -99.5 -63.6 -213.8
13.8 45.3 60.7 110.2. 73.9
173.0 245.0 273.9 346.0 257.1
-83.8 -228.6 -311.4 -459.9 -229.8
-94.0 -33.2 10.1 66.8 -45.7
4.8 16.8 27.4 47.1 18.4
80.6 115.8 140.4 174.1 1-08.2
-54.3 -145.7 -212.2 -301.7 -129.0
-27.5 24.8 61.8 110.9 16.4
1.2 5.1 10.0 16.8 4.4
a Data.for the reference solution are taken from Tamin/Meyanathan (1988) except for the supply, demand, and substitution elasticities which are 0.5.times the
point estimates given by Tamin/Meyanathan (1988) and Ahluwalia/Lysy 1983), respectively. The border price includes transport cost but was not corrected for
quality differences [see Tamin/Meyanathan (1988), footnote 14].
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If imported and domestically produced rice are not perfectly
substitutable in consumption, the no-intervention outcomes change
drastically. As a result of product differentiation in demand,
the fall in domestic rice prices will be smaller than in the case
of perfect substitutability and will never equal border prices.
As can be seen from Tables 3 and 4, domestic consumer and
producer prices in the free-trade situation are always above the
border price with consumer prices being a consumption-share
weighted average of the border and producer prices. As a result,
the welfare effects are much lower than in the case of perfect
substitutability.
This is best illustrated by comparing the previous results with
those calculated under the assumption of weak substitutability
(Table 4). In this case, producers realize a welfare gain of only
M$ 174.1 million in 1985, which is only one fourth of producers'
surplus estimated under the assumption of perfect substitut-
ability. This result is intuitively clear because with weak
substitutability domestic producers would benefit from "natural
protection" even in a free-trade situation. Furthermore,
consumers suffer a loss of M$ 301.7 million which is below 50
percent of the previous case. These consumer losses are mainly
attributable to the implicit tax on imports. As a result,
government expenditure for producer subsidies are relatively low
and revenues from imports are relatively high leaving net
government revenues of M$ 110.9 million as compared to net
expenditures of M$ 63.9 million with perfect substitutability.
Thus, the deadweight losses amount to only M$ 16.8 million in
1985. " Over the entire study period, the accumulated total
producer gain is estimated at M$ 619.1 million which is offset by
a total consumer loss of M$ 842.9 million and government revenues
of M$ 186.4 million.
Our results indicate that limited substitution possibilities can
play an important role in determining the final welfare effects
of government intervention in the Malaysian rice market. Assuming
stronger substitutability (o = 4.5) changes only the quantitative
results leaving the qualitative conclusions from the comparison- 22 -
of the two extreme cases unaffected. In any case, limited substi-
tution drives a wedge between domestic prices and border prices,
the extent of which depends on the degree of substitutability on
the consumer side, the share of imports in total domestic supply,
and the supply and demand conditions in the domestic market.
Some other observations which can be made from Tables 3 and 4 are
summarized in Table 5. There, the mean and the coefficient of
variation (C.V.) of selected variables over 1982 to 1986 in the
free-trade situation and for various elasticity assumptions are
confronted with those in the distorted situation. The results can
be summarized as follows:
1. In terms of magnitude, the supply mean is raised (though not
substantially), with intervention while demand is reduced
compared to intervention. Imports, on the other hand, were in
fact reduced over the period.
2. The changes in quantities increase with increasing substitut-
ability and increasing supply and demand elasticities. The
same holds true for producer and consumer prices. Thus,
limited substitutability diminishes the need to support
producer prices in order to increase producer income.
3. Limited substitution in connection with high supply and demand
elasticities has a stabilizing effect on both producer and
consumer prices. This result also suggests that there is less
need for intervention if substitution possibilities are
limited.
Although the above welfare calculations are not based on an
econometric estimation of the substitution elasticity for rice in
Malaysia, they have nevertheless generated some useful insights
into the impact of agricultural pricing policies. Perhaps the
most important result which emerges from our findings is the
importance of the import share in determining domestic price
changes. Standard trade theory would predict that, even for a
large market such as the rice market in Asian countries, price- 23 -
Table 5: Mean and Variation With and Without Intervention, Malaysia 1982-1986
Law Supply and Demand Elasticities



































































































































Production, consumption and imports in 1000 tons. Prices in M$/ton. C.V. is the coefficient of
variation. It is equal to the standard deviation of the respective variable divided by the mean of the
variable, times 100. Mean is the arithmetic mean.
Source: Own calculations based on data given in Tables 3 and 4.- 24 -
liberalization would exert strong pressure on domestic prices. On
the contrary, the Armington-specification implies that a large
market with a low import share has substantial price autonomy.
From the government point of view another interesting result is
the fact that expenditures to support the guaranteed minimum
price would need to be much lower than is predicted under
traditional assumptions.
The question remains whether the assumptions of product dif-
ferentiation at the micro level is reasonable. There may be
disagreement on the correct specification of the substitution
elasticity, but one certainly does not observe the degree of
substitutability found in standard trade theory.
4. Conclusions
It was investigated in this paper how measurement issues are
important when agricultural protection is analyzed. The focus was
on price uncertainty and limited substitution, two aspects which
are often neglected in studies on agricultural protection. The
following major findings can be summarized:
1. When uncertainty is introduced into the measurement of pro-
tection, e.g. by using normal rather than actual world prices
in nominal protection coefficients, the computed protection
levels are strongly affected. Additionally, it matters, how
normal world prices are calculated, i.e. how uncertainty in
world prices is excluded in the empirical analysis. The
analysis started from the important findings of Byerlee/Sain
who had denied a clear pattern of discrimination against wheat
producers in developing countries. This basic result was shown
to depend heavily on the introduction of normal rather than
actual world prices and on the way normal world prices are
modelled. When an econometric model rather than trend analysis
is utilized to model world prices, the qualitative result
changes and a discrimination against agriculture occurs in
most countries.- 25 -
2. The analysis on limited substitution in agricultural markets
showed that the economic impacts of a given level of agri-
cultural protection are crucially affected by the homogeneity
assumption. The application of an Armington framework to rice
policy in Malaysia shows that the welfare effects of liberal-
ization are overestimated when perfect substitution between
domestic and imported rice is assumed. When the more realistic
framework of imperfect substitution is considered, welfare
gains of liberalization become smaller. In cases with a low
substitution elasticity between domestic and imported goods,
the differentials in calculated welfare impacts are signi-
ficant.- 26 -
Footnotes . - .
As the raw data were not published, it was not possible to
replicate exactly the domestic price and the actual and normal
world prices Byerlee/Sain used. We measured the actual and
normal world prices on the basis of the data shown in Appendix
1. A linear time-trend analysis was utilized to compute the
normal price as in the Byerlee/Sain study. From this, we calcu-
lated a correction factor C = (p*/p ) which we multiplied by
NPC- in the Byerlee/Sain study to identify NPC . This
procedure assumes that the introduction of the normal world
price rather than the actual world price affected the nominal
protection coefficient by the same percentage in the
Byerlee/Sain study as on the basis of the data of Appendix 1.
Note that the limits of 0.85 and 1.15 contain an element of
arbitrariness. No economic interpretation can be given for
these values.
3 The formulation of equations (5) and (6)' implies that
production does not respond to changes in world prices within
the same period.
4 Again, a correction factor (p*/p**) was computed on the basis
w w
of the two alternative modelling approaches and the data basis
of Appendix 1. This correction factor was multiplied by NPC.. ,
as measured in the Byerlee/Sain study, to derive NPC,.
5 See Just/Hueth/Schmitz (1982) for an excellent treatment of
welfare measurement in related markets and Thurman/Wohlgenant
(1989) on estimation procedures. Many recent empirical studies
have tried to deal with such intermarket connections either by
estimating complex indicators [e.g. Krueger/Schiff/Valdes
(1988); Bautista (1987)] or by using multi-market [e.g.
Braverman/Hammer/Gron (1987)] and computable general equi-
librium models [e.g. de Janvry/Sadoulet (1987)].- 27 -
Without loss of generality the two products can be measured in
units such that they exchange at a price ratio of one for one
in the initial situation. In Figure 1, the demand curves are
drawn as straight lines for geometrical convenience; they may
be regarded as approximations to curvilinear curves.
There is little consensus on estimates of the substitution
elasticity for rice. The estimates reported in the literature
[e.g. Gardiner/Dixit (1986); Carter/Gardiner (1988)] vary
widely from very inelastic (less than 1) to very elastic
(greater than 1) in both the short-run (1 year) and the
long-run (more than 1 year). Literature estimates for rice in
Malaysia are not available. Ahluwalia/Lysy (1983) report a
substitution elasticity of 3.0 for food crops and this is used
here as a central tendency parameter for rice.- 28 -












































































































































































a Price of American Red Hardwinter 2, cif Rotterdam, in $/mt.- Price
of American Long Corn Rice, cif Northsea ports in $/mt.-
 c Weighted
real gross domestic product of the five major wheat-importing coun-
tries - China, USSR, Japan, United Kingdom and India - in mill.$. The
real gross domestic product is PPP-corrected according to the Inter-
national Comparison Project and in 1975 prices. The countries' shares
in wheat imports were used as weights. - Not included as the data
were irrelevant for the econometric model.
Sources: Columns (1) and (2): Statistisches Bundesamt, various years;
column (3): calculated with income data from Summers/Heston
(1984) and Summers/Heston (1988) and the countries' shares in
wheat imports taken from FAO (a) various years; column (4):
FAO (1987 b); column^ (5): FAO (b), various years.- 29 -
Appendix 2: The Influence of Price Uncertainty on the Measured Nomi-





























































































































































NPC1 is the nominal
It utilizes the normal
measured as the
protection coefficient used by Byerlee/Sain.
world market price in the denominator,
value of a linear trend function on the basis of
world prices for the period 1960-82. NPC2 ^
s based on the actual
world prices rather than on the normal world price. NPC. is again
based on a normal world price which is, however, calculated with an
econometric world market model. For the exact measurement of NPC. to
NPC-, see the text.
Sources: Own computations with data from Byerlee/Sain (1986),
A-l and the sources cited in Appendix 1.
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